Cross-cutting themes

The Iran war is a common driver of several of the results in this report. Closure of the Strait of Hormuz kept oil 60–70% above its pre-war level and pushed US diesel above $6 a gallon, which fed the affordability anger that helped decide races from Texas to Maine. The same price shock raised electricity costs, which turned local opposition to data centers into a statewide issue in Texas and Georgia. A settlement that reopens the strait would ease fuel prices, reduce the political heat on data centers and lower European gas prices. The election has raised the odds of a settlement, because the president has acknowledged the war cost his party, and it has raised the odds of a short escalation before a Democratic Congress can restrict war funding. The two outcomes have opposite effects on every energy-linked section of this report.

Gulf capital, AI chips and data-center finance form a second cluster. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar pledged investment in US AI infrastructure while seeking access to advanced chips, and Commerce authorized Blackwell exports to G42 and Humain. US data-center restrictions at home make Gulf sites more attractive for compute, which increases demand for export licenses. A Democratic Congress can investigate the Trump family's Gulf business, examine the security conditions on chip exports and delay arms sales. That puts the Gulf states in the position of courting an executive that controls licenses while managing a Congress that controls arms-sale review and subpoenas.

Tariff policy links Canada, Mexico, Southeast Asia, India, agriculture and critical minerals. The shift from IEEPA to Sections 301 and 232 means Congress cannot easily unwind tariffs, so trading partners will read the midterms as weakening the president politically without weakening his tools. That encourages some governments to close deals quickly, as Canada and Mexico appear to be doing, and others to wait, as some Asian investors may do with pledges. The China truce expiry on 10 January 2027 is the single date that could reset several of these relationships at once, including rare-earth supply to US industry.

Taiwan, China and semiconductors are bound together through chip tariffs, H200 licenses and the pending arms package. The Shenzhen summit is the first point at which a constrained president could trade Taiwan-related timing for Chinese purchases, and it is the place where bipartisan China hawks in Congress are most likely to push back with legislation that can attract veto-proof support.

The Arctic, Canada and the EU are linked through NATO and the force posture review. Greenland's security agreement, Canada's Golden Dome participation and European troop levels are all executive decisions that Congress funds. A president seeking to show strength abroad has more room on these questions than on domestic policy.

The main through-line is a likely shift of presidential effort toward foreign and trade policy. Lame-duck presidents have often turned abroad, as an EU Institute for Security Studies analyst noted on 4 November, citing George W. Bush and Barack Obama (EUISS), and the calendar points the same way, with the Abu Dhabi talks, the Manila and Shenzhen summits, the G20 in December and the January truce deadline all falling before or just after the new Congress sits. The evidence for which way Trump moves will come in the next ten weeks, through whether he reaches deals that he can present as wins, or uses force and tariffs to show he still sets terms. The two are not exclusive: the administration paired the 2 November strikes on Iran with continued mediation, and it may pair tariff threats with trade deals in the same way.