Global democracy and the rule of law

The US rule-of-law record of 2025–26 is mixed in a way that matters for the new Congress. The Supreme Court has checked the president on several major questions. It ruled that IEEPA does not authorize tariffs, struck down the order ending birthright citizenship on 30 June 2026, rejected the federalization of the National Guard for deployment in Illinois in December 2025, after which the administration ended deployments in Los Angeles, Chicago and Portland, and kept Lisa Cook on the Fed board (Supreme Court; Supreme Court; Politico). It also overruled Humphrey's Executor in Trump v. Slaughter on 29 June 2026, giving the president power to remove members of multi-member agencies such as the FTC at will (SCOTUSblog). The administration has generally complied with Supreme Court rulings while moving to alternative authorities, as with tariffs.

Lower courts have been a firmer check on politically directed prosecutions. The indictments of former FBI Director James Comey and New York Attorney General Letitia James were dismissed because the prosecutor who obtained them had been unlawfully appointed (Just Security). The Justice Department has since charged Comey a third time, over an alleged decade-old leak, and told Judge Trevor McFadden on 30 October that it was seeking a further indictment (Politico). In the hours before polls opened, federal judges issued rulings restricting the administration's pressure on state election officials over alleged noncitizen voting (Reuters). On 1 November Judge Sharon Gleason dismissed a Justice Department suit that sought to block certification of Alaska's Senate result if Senator Sullivan lost, a case the department says it will appeal, and the department has sent target letters in a related criminal inquiry over a second candidate named Dan Sullivan on the ballot (AP; AP). These episodes show the courts working as a check and the executive testing the boundaries of federal involvement in elections.

What the new Congress can add is investigation, confirmation and money. It can subpoena officials on prosecutions, pardons and the removal of inspectors general; refuse to confirm nominees for US attorney, judgeships and agency posts; legislate protections for inspectors general and for election administration, which Trump would veto; and use appropriations riders to limit specific Justice Department activities. It cannot compel compliance with court orders, end prosecutions or reverse pardons. Impeachment of cabinet officers is now likely to be attempted, but conviction requires 67 senators.

The administration has expanded the use of force without congressional authorization, from the capture of Maduro to the Iran war and lethal strikes on suspected drug boats, and has relied on Article II and self-defense arguments that most allies have not endorsed. On 9 October 2026 the United States sanctioned the International Criminal Court as an institution, with a six-month grace period, hours after a former ICC judge won the Nobel Peace Prize (US Department of State; Reuters). Other states read these actions as confirming that US commitments to international law are conditional, and the Iran war's effects on fuel prices have given governments from Spain to South Africa domestic reasons to distance themselves. A Democratic Congress can hold hearings on the legal basis for strikes and on ICC sanctions, but sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act remain presidential.

Three elections in large democracies went against the populist right in 2026: Fidesz's defeat in Hungary in April, Lula's victory over Flávio Bolsonaro in Brazil, and the US midterms. In Hungary, Prime Minister Péter Magyar's government is recovering access to EU funds, with the Council approving a new recovery plan in July that allows about €10 billion to be disbursed (Council of the EU). The common thread is voter anger over prices and corruption more than a single ideological shift, which argues for treating the results as national reactions to incumbents and conditions. The populist right remains strong elsewhere. In France, the appeals court upheld Marine Le Pen's embezzlement conviction in July but shortened her ban on standing for office, and she has said she will run in 2027 while appealing further, with the National Rally leading the polls (Reuters). In Germany, the AfD is near the top of national polls, and 57% of adults support a Constitutional Court review of whether to ban it (evangelisch.de, citing YouGov). Measured decline has also reached the United States: V-Dem reported that the US liberal democracy score fell 24% in a year, and Freedom House cut the US score by three points (V-Dem; Freedom House).

The measures against Brazil's judiciary, including Global Magnitsky sanctions on Justice Alexandre de Moraes and tariffs justified in part by the prosecution of Jair Bolsonaro, show how the administration uses economic tools against courts abroad. After Lula's victory, Trump said the Brazilian vote "looked like another rigged election," and the administration is issuing visas to Flávio Bolsonaro, who left Brazil in defiance of a Supreme Court order to surrender his passports (Reuters). A president facing hostile committees at home may lean more on these tools, because sanctions designations and visa bans require no congressional approval. A Democratic Congress can expose and criticize them, and can write limits into future sanctions statutes, but the Graham Act waiver shows how easily discretionary language is used against the intent of its authors.

For companies, rule-of-law risk is commercial risk. In the United States, the Slaughter ruling means independent regulators can be reshaped by the president, which makes the FTC, and potentially the SEC and FCC, more responsive to White House priorities and less predictable across administrations. Companies have faced politically directed enforcement and favor, from merger approvals to export licenses and federal contracts, and the new Congress will investigate both, exposing firms to subpoenas whichever side they took. Courts remain a reliable venue for contract and statutory claims, and the IEEPA refunds show they can impose large costs on the government. Abroad, US sanctions on courts and officials, as in Brazil and at the ICC, create compliance exposure for banks and technology providers that serve those institutions. The evidence from 2026 is that democratic checks are working where institutions hold clear legal authority, in courts with jurisdiction and electorates with a vote, and failing where statutes give the executive discretion that it uses against the purpose Congress intended.