Latin America

The administration's Latin America policy has relied heavily on military force. US forces captured Nicolás Maduro in Caracas on 3 January 2026, and acting president Delcy Rodríguez has since signed an agreement giving the United States preferential access to Venezuela's oil fields (Reuters; House of Commons Library). US forces have conducted lethal strikes on suspected drug boats in the Caribbean and Pacific. The USMCA was not renewed in July.

Mexico carries the most exposure. Mexico faces US tariffs on autos, steel and aluminum, cartel designations as terrorist organizations, and border friction: in October Mexico announced the deployment of 500 troops along the Tamaulipas border, and President Claudia Sheinbaum demanded evidence after the US ambassador said shots had been fired from the Mexican side (Reuters). Sheinbaum has repeatedly rejected US military intervention in Mexico. A Democratic Congress cannot change tariffs or terrorism designations, but it can scrutinize the legal basis for any US military action on Mexican territory through war-powers resolutions and appropriations limits, and it will hold hearings on the strikes at sea. Mexico's best near-term path is a tariff deal with an administration that wants wins before the annual USMCA review; its main risk is a unilateral US strike on cartel targets, which a constrained president might see as a show of strength.

Brazil re-elected Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in the 25 October 2026 runoff by more than four million votes, after Flávio Bolsonaro led the first round with 47% (Reuters; TSE). Bolsonaro refused to recognize the result, left for Miami after refusing a Supreme Court order to surrender his passports, and is receiving US visas for himself and his family; Trump said the vote "looked like another rigged election," though Reuters reports he is not planning to back Bolsonaro's claim to the presidency (Reuters; Reuters; Reuters). The United States imposed 50% tariffs on Brazil in 2025, many later rolled back, and Global Magnitsky sanctions on Justice Alexandre de Moraes (CRS). Congress can hold hearings on the Magnitsky designations and on visas granted to Bolsonaro, but sanctions are an executive power.

Argentina's Javier Milei relies on the $20 billion currency swap facility the US Treasury provided in October 2025, which a Democratic Congress will scrutinize but cannot unwind (Bloomberg). Colombia elected the Trump-endorsed Abelardo de la Espriella in June (AP). Across the region, the key question is whether a constrained president steps up military pressure, including on Cuba, where some analysts expect him to seek a managed transition (EUISS). War-powers votes on Latin American operations are likely to pass a Democratic Congress but would face a veto.