Southeast Asia

Southeast Asian economies faced repeated tariff shocks: the reciprocal tariffs of 2025, their invalidation, the Section 122 surcharge and the Section 301 forced-labor tariffs of 10% or 12.5% on 60 economies from 24 July 2026 (USTR). Vietnam's deputy prime minister, Pham Gia Tuc, said in October that trade talks with the United States were nearly complete, while US officials were more cautious (Reuters), and Washington has been writing anti-transshipment commitments into its agreements with the region.

The midterms have little direct bearing on the region because the relevant power lies with USTR, Commerce and Customs. Trump travels to Manila for the ASEAN summit on 16–18 November, where tariff relief, transshipment rules and South China Sea security are likely to be on the agenda (The Straits Times). Southeast Asian governments made few public comments on the result. Their incentive is to finalize deals at the summit while Trump wants announcements, and to hedge by deepening trade with China.

The election also affects the region indirectly. Data-center restrictions in Texas and Georgia make Malaysia's Johor and other regional hubs more attractive for hyperscaler capacity, though US export controls on advanced chips limit what can be deployed there. And the Iran war's effect on fuel prices hits import-dependent economies such as the Philippines and Thailand hardest. The US-Philippines alliance and the South China Sea remain executive matters, though Congress funds the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement sites.